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Hello all readers, Welcome to The Parmeter Politics and Policy Record ! My name is Nathan Parmeter, an aspiring public policy professional a...

Showing posts with label Quantitative Analysis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Quantitative Analysis. Show all posts

May 16, 2021

Congressional Incumbents Who Lost by Double-Digits from 2010-2020

5/17/2021 UPDATE: After initial publication of this article on 5/16/2021, I noticed that I neglected to include instances from the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections where three House incumbents lost by double-digits. As of 6:45pm PST on 5/17/2021, I corrected Visual 1, Table 1, and the writing below to account for this. I also changed some of the notes below Visual 1 and Table 1. 

April 18, 2021

A Look at Alabama's Seven Congressional Elections from 2016

A Look at Alabama's Seven Congressional Elections from 2016

Introduction: The 2016 House elections overall may have been a relative wash, but that doesn't mean there were some interesting or unique results from across the country. For example, three Minnesota Democrats narrowly won re-election in largely-White and rural House seats whose area significantly moved towards Donald Trump. Meanwhile, incumbent Republicans in largely-suburban seats easily won re-election despite their districts trending heavily towards Hillary Clinton, and even voting for her (Kondik). Across the country in Alabama came several other interesting House election results, including an unusually close re-election for a Republican incumbent in what should have been an easy victory, and three incumbents facing no major-party opposition. Today's post will detail all of these races, with an extensive focus on the former due to it being abnormal for the region and time period. 

Visual 1: Alabama's U.S. House District Lines, 2013-2021

Base Image Source: "File:Alabama Congressional Districts, 113th Congress.tif." Wikimedia Commons, 31 Jan. 2014, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alabama_Congressional_Districts,_113th_Congress.tif. National Atlas of the United States, United States Department of the Interior. Accessed 16 Apr. 2021. 

Visual 2: 2016 Alabama House and Presidential Results by County

Note: County-level results refer to the combined vote totals for all Congressional districts within each county. For example, Montgomery County is split between three districts (the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th). All votes from both parties together, House Democratic candidates won Montgomery County's vote. 

Data Sources: "State of Alabama Canvass" (percentages were self-calculated)

Table 1: 2016 Alabama House and Presidential Results by Congressional District

Notes: Congressional candidates with "Rep." in front indicate incumbents, while bolded and italicized names indicate winners per Congressional race. For Presidential election results, "Write-In/Other" results combine the totals for candidates Gary Johnson (Libertarian), Jill Stein (Green), and Write-In votes, while the statewide winner is bolded and italicized. 

Data Source: "Daily Kos Elections," "State of Alabama Canvass" (percentages were self-calculated) 

2016 Presidential and House Results: As expected, Donald Trump (R) easily won Alabama in 2016, taking around 63% of the vote to Clinton's 35%. At the House level, the partisan composition remained unchanged with 6 Republicans and 1 Democrat, and every district voted for the same party in both the Presidential and Congressional elections (Table 1) . 

District-by-District Rundown (North to South): I normally go in numerical or alphabetical order when discussing a list of legislative districts or seats, but this will be an exception because I want to save the best for last (you'll see why), and it happens to relate to the southern part of Alabama. Note that on the county maps below displaying results by district, some counties are labeled with an asterisk (*), which indicates that the result in that county is only for that district's portion of the county. I haven't yet learned how to create Congressional district lines in Tableau yet, hence why I'll be using a slightly-modified county map instead. 

     Visual 3: 2016 AL-5 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-5: Starting in the Northern part of the Yellowhammer State is AL-5, which contains the cities of Huntsville and Decatur. In 2016, incumbent Rep. Mo Brooks (R) won another term against Democrat Will Boyd. Rep. Brooks recently announced that they will vacate AL-5 to try for Alabama's Class 3 Senate seat, which is open due to Sen. Richard Shelby (R)'s expected retirement. Previously, Rep. Brooks tried for the Republican nomination in the 2017 Special Senate election, but did not make it to the nomination ("Firebrand"). 
 
     Visual 4: 2016 AL-4 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-4: Stretching across a swath of north-central Alabama, this mostly rural- and small-city-based seat is among the most Republican in the country. In 2016, Rep. Robert Aderholt (R) ran without major-party opposition. 

     Visual 5: 2016 AL-6 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-6: Ringing around Birmingham to encompass its wealthy and majority-White suburbs, and some surrounding areas, AL-6 is also very Republican. In 2016, Rep. Gary Palmer (R) won another term over Democrat David Putnam. 

     Visual 6: 2016 AL-3 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-3: Encompassing a large swath of eastern Alabama, including the cities of Auburn and Talladega, AL-3 is also a fairly Republican district. In 2016, Rep. Mike Rogers (R) won another term over Democrat Jesse Smith. Other than Rep. Roby's district (we'll get to that later), this was the only Republican-held district in Alabama where the Democratic candidate won at least one whole county; in this case, Smith won majority-Black Macon County, which voted heavily for Obama (both times), Clinton, and Biden. Smith also narrowly lost neighboring Russell County (lower-right of Macon), which is also largely-Black and narrowly voted for both Biden and Clinton. 

     Visual 7: 2016 AL-7 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-7: Since 2011, AL-7 has been the only Democratic-held House district in Alabama, as this VRA-compliant district is majority-Black, and is extremely Democratic. Among the areas within the district include Tuscaloosa (home to the University of Alabama), majority-Black parts of Birmingham and Montgomery, Selma, and several rural majority-Black counties. Multiple normally-Republican-voting counties are also located in the district, but their electoral effect on the district is minor due to their small population. The district is also known for its extreme lack of two-party competitiveness, as current incumbent Rep. Terri Sewell (D) hasn't faced a Republican since 2012! ("House Map - Election 2012"; "House Election Results 2014"; "Alabama Election Results 2016; "House Election Results 2018"; "House Election Results 2020") This includes 2016, where the only opposition was a scattering of write-in votes, as seen in Table 1 above.  

     Visual 8: 2016 AL-1 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-1: At the southern tip of Alabama is AL-1, which in addition to Mobile contains some beach and vacation towns in neighboring Baldwin County, and several rural counties to the north and northeast. In 2016, incumbent Rep. Bradley Byrne (R) won without major-party opposition. Subsequently, he retired in 2020 to vie for the Alabama Senate Republican nomination, but like Rep. Brooks in 2017, failed to make it past the first round. The seat was won last November by Jerry Carl (R), a Mobile County Commissioner (Sharp). 

     Visual 9: 2016 AL-2 House Results by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     AL-2: As promised, the most abnormal and fascinating 2016 U.S. House race from Alabama is saved for last. In its current form, AL-2 contains most of Southeastern Alabama including parts of Montgomery, a large swath of rural and small-city majority-White territory, and a small portion of the "Black Belt." As a brief history behind why this district saw an extremely abnormal 2016 House result, in 2008, conservative Democrat Bobby Bright (then the Mayor of Birmingham) narrowly won the district after longtime incumbent Tony Everett (R) retired. Before then, the district had been in Republican hands since the 1960s (Elliot). However, Bright's first term did not translate into a second despite the incumbent bucking the party on the controversial ACA and generally being socially-conservative. In contrast to his conservative image, he supported House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D) (which later haunted him again in 2018, below) and voted for the 2009 spending bill that garnered little Republican Congressional support. These decisions and the 2010 environment rapidly caught up to him, as he (narrowly) lost that year to Montgomery Councilmember Martha Roby (R) (Cliff). Rep. Roby ended up easily winning two more terms in the post-2010 Census version of AL-2 before the 2016 cycle came about. 

    Visual 10: 2016 Alabama U.S. House Write-In % by County

     Data Source: "State of Alabama" 

     Despite a spirited primary challenge by Tea Party favorite Becky Gerritson (R), Rep. Roby successfully cleared the primary (Troyan, "Dumping"). Her fortunes changed significantly when the Access Hollywood tape against then-Presidential nominee Donald Trump (R) emerged that October. Rep. Roby came out in heavy opposition to Trump, even going as far as urging him to withdrawal his campaign, something that (unexpectedly, considering its very-red tint) angered many conservative voters in the district (Gattis). Because of this, a conservative-led write-in campaign was launched against her, with Gerritson being the campaign's main write-in candidate despite the state party's rules against primary election "sore losers" running in general elections (Troyan, "Martha"). All of the write-in votes (Gerritson and others) in AL-2 received around 11% of the vote, with higher write-in support correlating with higher Trump electoral performance at the county-level (Visuals 2 and 10). The write-in campaign against her caused Rep. Roby to win re-election with only 48% of the vote, an 8% margin over farmer and State Representative Nathan Mathis (D) (Table 1), who had previously run for both parties (Hannon). Rep. Roby's winning margin ran almost 25% behind Trump's in AL-2 (Table 1), thus showcasing the extent of his popularity and her decline in conservative support due to her opposition to the Presidential nominee. To illustrate this, in the counties located along the AL-FL border, which from west to east are Covington, Geneva, and Houston (Dothan), Roby's winning margin was over 35% behind Trump's! Note the correlation between this and the high levels of write-in support in this region, which likely illustrates the extent to which the write-in campaign negatively impacted Rep. Roby's 2016 campaign. While I did not make a map of the county-level write-in results for the rest of the state, only AL-7's Pickens County (west of Tuscaloosa County) saw a write-in percentage anywhere near as high as AL-2 (5.2%; self-calculated) ("State of Alabama"). 

     On the Democratic side, Mathis ran ahead of Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton (D) throughout the district, but not enough to pull off an upset victory. Had this happened, AL-2 would have been the most Republican district held by a House Democrat, as Donald Trump won AL-2 by 32% and took 65% of its vote (Table 1). In reality, after 2016, the only House Democrat occupying a district that Republican was MN-7's Rep. Collin Peterson (D), whose district voted for Trump by 30.8% after swinging heavily compared to 2016 (Kondik). A year later, Mathis attended a Roy Moore rally to express opposition to the controversial Republican, who was the nominee for the 2017 Special Senate election. In particular, Mathias criticized Moore's anti-LGBTQ+ views, as Mathis's daughter had committed suicide as a lesbian; he had previously expressed anti-gay views as well (Hannon).

     After Trump settled into his presidential term, Rep. Roby warmed to him as she faced a difficult primary two years later against ex-Rep. Bright, who had changed parties. After President Trump endorsed her, she defeated Bright once again (Bland). After winning her fourth term, she decided to retire from the seat in 2020, which was won by state legislator Barry Moore (R) (Beck). 

Twitter Poll: Last Thursday evening, I made a Twitter poll asking whether Mathis would have won another term in 2018 if he had (somehow) won AL-2 in 2016, all else held equal. After reading the content above, if you would like, feel free to vote here before the poll closes this coming Friday! 

Conclusion: For the reasons discussed above, if Mathis had pulled off an upset victory against Roby, it would have been one of the most significant Congressional results of the previous decade. Looking at 2014-2020 House election results, this has been the only instance since 2014 that a largely non-urban and majority-White Southern district where Donald Trump received 55% of the vote (either time) has come within 10% of voting for a Democrat in a regular Congressional election. A semi-exception (that also had unusual circumstances) was the 2017 special election in SC-5, which contains some of Charlotte's southern exurbs and a significant amount of rural and small-town territory, some of it part of the "Black Belt." In that year's election, Democrat Archie Parnell almost won the seat against Republican Ralph Norman. While the final result in SC-5 was narrow, it is important to note that overall turnout was very low in the district that gave 55% to Trump in 2016 (Nir; "Norman"). Nonetheless, even in a year where Democrats were generally disappointed at the House results, due to failing to flip many districts they targeted, the unusually close AL-2 election stands out as a significant sore thumb despite the unusual dynamics of the race. 

March 07, 2021

Arnold and Steve 2006: A Quantitative Analysis of The Last Republicans to Win California

Author's Note: A word of warning: today's post is going to be one of the most complex and intricate posts I have created on this blog, and the first in a while. In particular, today's post is going to be data visualization-heavy, as I have been experimenting a lot with Tableau and dataset formatting lately to produce some of the visualizations you will see below. 

January 31, 2021

County-Level Determinants and Support for the 2020 Mississippi Flag Referendum

County-Level Determinants and Support for the 2020 Mississippi Flag Referendum

Introduction: In addition to last year's presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections, several closely-watched referendum votes took place across the country on varying policy topics. One of the most high-profile referendum votes was the Mississippi Flag Referendum (or Measure 3). In the aftermath of George Floyd's death and intense discussion of past and present racism in America, pressure grew on Mississippi to change its flag, which still bore the Confederate battle flag. The state government demoted the old flag from public use and formed a special commission to create a new state flag design (Pettus, "Mississippi's new magnolia"). 

With broad support, a replacement flag design was chosen by the commission, with the adoption choice to be given to the state's voters through Measure 3; a majority "Yes" vote would support adopting the flag, while a majority "No" vote would have led to the new design not being adopted (Cineas). On Election Day, the referendum passed with almost 75% support from Mississippi voters, a wide swing compared to the similar 2001 flag referendum, which failed by double-digits (Avery). In early January, the state legislature voted on, and Governor Tate Reeves (R) signed legislation that made the new flag official (Pettus, "Mississippi governor"). Today's post seeks to understand which socio-demographic and political determinants were most associated with support for the referendum through analyzing county-level socio-demographic, socio-economic, and political data. In particular, the quantitative analysis portion of the post will further break down the data to determine the same levels of correlation among White Mississippians. 

Visual 1: Mississippi Measure 3 Vote by County

Note: On the scale, a county with a color corresponding to "1" indicates that the difference between the percent who voted "Yes" and the percent who voted "No" was 100%, vice-versa for "-1,". 

Election Results and Polling Analysis: Visual 1 above showcases the results of the referendum by county, showing its broad support. All but two counties (George and Greene) supported the referendum, and only two others (Perry and Tishomingo) supported it by less than a 10% margin. All of the counties containing major urban and suburban areas voted in favor of the referendum, as did all the counties that voted for President Joe Biden (D). Based off county results alone, support was highest in majority-Black counties (especially the "Black Belt" counties in the Mississippi River valley) and all of Mississippi's major urban/suburban counties. Opposition to Measure 3 was highest in the southeastern and northeastern portions of the state, which are rural and majority-White. 

I was only able to find one pre-election poll asking Mississippians about the flag referendum, which was released in October 2020, and polled 507 likely voters. 61% of those polled supported changing Mississippi's flag, including a vast majority of Democratic, Independent, Black, urban, college-educated, and young voters regardless of race. A smaller but fairly large net proportion of suburban, rural, and college-educated White voters also indicated they would vote "Yes," while White voters overall narrowly supported it. Opposition to the measure in the poll was mainly concentrated among Republican voters (50% opposing with 41% supporting), White voters over age 35, non-college-educated White voters, and Trump supporters, although opposition among those groups was not overwhelming ("Mississippi," 7).

Methodology: Table 1 below displays all of the variables that will be used in this post, and how each one is modeled. Election data came from CNN, while all raw socio-demographic and -economic data was transcribed from the Census Bureau's 2019 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates, available on the Census Bureau's public databank (previously FactFinder). Population density data was transcribed from the Census Bureau's COVID-19 data site, with the most recent data being 8 months past. Links to each source are posted below. 

Table 1: Variables 


Note: All variables refer to the values at the county-level. The dependent variable is notated by (DV), while independent variables are notated by (IV). 

Two different correlation models will be used, one including all of Mississippi's 84 counties, and the other examining counties that are at least 50% White to control for majority-Black counties that are socio-demographically similar to rural majority-White counties (e.g. population, population density, college education attainment rates, etc.). As indicated in Table 1, the dependent variable is "Yes" support for Measure 3, while 8 explanatory variables will be correlated, several of which will utilize data on White individuals per county specifically. 

Results:

Table 2: Correlation Results

Notes: Values in parenthesis refer to the p-value per correlation calculation. Values shaded in red are statistically-significant at the 5% level or lower. 

As shown on Table 1, the independent variables featuring the strongest correlation with the dependent variable were %White, %WhiteCollegeEduc, and the two presidential election candidate variables (Biden and Trump support). When narrowing the units of analysis to majority-White counties, the correlation strength of %CollegeEduc, %WhiteCollegeEduc, Population, and PopDensity all increase significantly. Between the two models, AverageAge (all and White) and MedianIncome show the weakest levels of correlation with referendum support, except for Population and PopDensity when all counties are included in the analysis. 

Analysis and Inferences: While the county-level quantitative analysis conducted above do not perfectly reveal electoral trends because such data aggregates all citizens per county (including those who can't and/or didn't vote), some inferences can be made from the correlation results relative to the pre-referendum poll discussed above. For example, the high level of positive correlation between counties with higher rates of college degree attainment (especially among majority-White areas and White citizens) and higher "Yes" support stands out. On the other hand, locales with higher percentages of White citizens are associated with declining support parallels the exit poll's finding that White voters' pre-election support for the referendum was heavily divided with significant pockets of opposition. This links up to the poll's findings that a majority of urban and suburban voters supported the measure, while rural voters were divided. A surprising result was the lack of significant correlation between median age (all and majority-White) and support for the referendum, as the poll showed that young voters (White and Nonwhite) heavily supported the measure, while older voters were more split (and older White voters opposing it). This is likely a reflection on the usage of county-level statistics, as the total range of median ages was relatively small in this data sample, thus obscuring the actual ages of both voters and those living in the state. Finally, despite the relatively weak level of positive correlation, counties with higher population and population density were associated with higher support, especially when examining majority-White areas. 

Data Sources:

"Average Household Size and Population Density." US Census Bureau COVID-19 Site, covid19.census.gov/datasets/average-household-size-and-population-density-county/data?geometry=-113.942%2C-52.677%2C114.573%2C85.376&orderBy=State. Accessed 27 Jan. 2021. 

"Explore Census Data." United States Census Bureau, data.census.gov/cedsci/. Accessed 27 Jan. 2021. 

"Mississippi Ballot Measure Results." CNN, last updated 16 Dec. 2020, www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/state/mississippi/ballot-measures/1. Accessed 27 Jan. 2021. 

"Mississippi President Results." CNN, last updated 16 Dec. 2020, www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/state/mississippi/president. Accessed 27 Jan. 2021. 

Works Cited:  

Avery, Dan. "Mississippi voters decide to replace Confederate-themed state flag." NBC News, 3 Nov. 2020, www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/mississippi-voters-decide-replace-confederate-themed-state-flag-n1246244. Accessed 28 Jan. 2021. 

Cineas, Fabiola. "Live results for Mississippi’s new state flag ballot initiative." Vox, 4 Nov. 2020, www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/11/3/21546895/live-results-mississippi-measure-3-state-flag-ballot-initiative. Accessed 28 Jan. 2021. 

"Mississippi Survey October 2020." Civiqs, 2020. civiqs.com/documents/Civiqs_DailyKos_MS_banner_book_2020_10_46eq84.pdf. Accessed 27 Jan. 2021. 

Pettus, Emily Wagster. "Mississippi governor signs law for new state flag without rebel sign." Clarion Ledger, 11 Jan. 2021, www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/11/mississippi-governor-sign-law-new-state-flag-without-rebel-sign/6627621002/. Accessed 31 Jan. 2021. 

---. "Mississippi’s new magnolia flag starting to fly after vote." Associated Press, 4 Nov. 2020, apnews.com/article/election-2020-religion-race-and-ethnicity-mississippi-elections-3e31d01e0e0b8c062ea202b7d8424ecf. Accessed 30 Jan. 2021. 

November 22, 2020

Senators Remaining in 2021 from the 2009 ACA vote

Author's Notes: There will not be a post this coming Thursday, November 26th, due to the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States. For my American readers both at home and abroad, have a safe and healthy Thanksgiving! 

September 20, 2020

Converting CA's 2020 House "Jungle Primary" Results to "Regular Primary" Results

Author's Notes: I had this post in mind even before Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg passed away this weekend at the age of 87. I want to iterate to everyone who reads and follows my blog that out of respect for the late justice, I will not immediately discuss or speculate about the political implications of her death (including the controversy over whether she should be replaced before the next Congress is seated), especially the implications for this year's elections. 

In addition, while randomly browsing 2020 primary election results, I realized that I neglected to mention Representative Yvette Clarke (D, NY-9)'s 2020 primary result on last Thursday's post providing a rundown of 2020's close House primary results. The final results showed her winning renomination by just under a 30% margin, thus qualifying this case for that post, as I sought to include all incumbents who won renomination by less than 30%. As such, I modified that page to reflect the addition. 

August 30, 2020

The San Joaquin Valley Electoral Politics Project, Part 1: 2010-2018 Gubernatorial Results

Author's Notes: Those of you coming here from my Twitter profile will have noticed that in the last week and a half, I have jumped into Twitter's #ElectionTwitter community through making a series of Tableau-created maps illustrating the electoral history of California's San Joaquin Valley, where I come from. This post will kick off a long-term project on this blog called The San Joaquin Valley Politics Project, where I will analyze, document, and discuss historical and current electoral trends in the San Joaquin Valley. 

August 23, 2020

A Comparison of State-Level Differences in Asian-American Poverty

Author's Notes: You all might notice a major change to the content of this blog, that being the variety and sophistication of data visualizations representing raw data. After initially learning and using Tableau for my graduate capstone project in the Spring, I have been practicing data visualization creation offline. Now, I am please to announce that I will start creating and using Tableau-created visualizations to supplement qualitative information presented on this blog, and may still use Excel-created visualizations in some situations. For today, I will post just the static (non-interactive) versions, and will update this page with the interactive online versions once I make my Tableau public account and publish my visualizations (past and future) there. 

July 19, 2020

Examining the State-Level Minimum Wage-Income Inequality Relationship

Examining the State-Level Minimum Wages-Income Inequality Relationship

Introduction: Throughout the social and economic policy analysis community, the effects of the minimum wage on various socio-economic indicators are extensively studied and debated. One of these significant socio-economic indicators is income inequality. One argument suggests that income inequality is reduced by increasing the minimum wage, as doing so raises the income of low-income workers, thus reducing inequality with those whose incomes fall above the income line (Thompson). On the other hand, a 2014 Congressional Budget Report suggested that the positive effects of a higher minimum wage on income inequality is balanced by higher unemployment for some low-income workers as a result of losing jobs to the higher minimum wage (i.e. higher cost to retain) (Alsalam et al., 1). This in turn could lead to an increase in inequality through the decline of former workers' wages, thus balancing out against the rise in wages of still-employed workers. Based on this debate, today's will take a close look at state-level minimum wages and evaluate whether higher minimum wages are associated with a significant change in income inequality at the state level. 

Methodology: State-level minimum wage data from 2018 (to match up with the most recent Gini coefficient data, below) was extracted from the Department of Labor's website. Any states that did not have a state-level minimum wage were given the Federal minimum wage. Minnesota, Nevada and Oklahoma were excluded because their state-level minimum wages are applied differently to firms depending on firm size ("Changes to"). 

The explanatory variable (income inequality) will be operationalized using the Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the distribution of income by percentiles within a jurisdiction (Duffin). In other words, in an ideal world, if the bottom 20% of a population received 20% of the jurisdiction's income, the next 20% received 20%, and so on, the Gini coefficient would be 0, representing a perfect distribution. On the other hand, if one person held all of the jurisdiction's income and everybody else made no income, then the Gini coefficient would be 1, representing perfect inequality. State-level Gini coefficient data came from Statista, and was most recently available from 2018 (Duffin). 

Aside from the independent and explanatory variables, I will also look at whether additional third variables are associated with income inequality. Variables that are related to state-level legislation and their sources are listed below:
  • Right-to-Work Legislation: "Right to work" laws prohibit unions from charging non-unionized employees dues that fund union initiatives, or to even force employees to join a union ("Right to work frequently"). The 2010s witnessed a major surge of right-to-work laws being passed in many states, and even nationally, which President Trump proposed in 2017 (Bruno and Manzo IV, 1). In addition to contributing to a decline in union membership among workers (explored more in another variable, below), such laws have been argued to be (indirectly, and somewhat directly) responsible for the increase in income inequality through decreasing unionization, which leads to lower wages among workers ("The Impact"). This connection is due to the fact that when unions are stronger and have more bargaining power, they are able to be more assertive on employers to pay higher wages, thus reducing inequality (Hiltzik). Right-to-work laws are argued to increase income inequality through weakening unions as a result of reduced union membership, thus giving unions less bargaining power (Hiltzik). Data on right-to-work legislation status by state (as of 2018) was taken from the National Right to Work Committee's website, and each state was coded "1" if they had right-to-work legislation in force, and "0" if not. 
  • Highest Income Bracket Tax Rates: One of the most basic socio-economic rationales of the income tax is that it redistributes wealth from higher-income individuals to lower-income individuals, thus helping improve the lives of those with little income (McLure). In the United States, individuals are levied the income tax that varies on what income bracket they fall into, with the highest bracket receiving the highest tax rate (Scarboro). Data on state-level income tax bracket rates in 2018 came from The Tax Foundation (Scarboro). Note that in 2018, 7 states did not have an income tax (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) (Scarboro), and were coded as "0.0%" for that variable.
In addition, the following socio-demographic and -economic variables that are independent of state-level legislation will be studied to understand similar effects:
  • Post-Secondary Degree Attainment: In the discussion of American poverty and income inequality, a topic that has been extensively discussed is the "college premium," in which college-educated individuals have seen significant increases in income and employment opportunities in recent years than non-college educated individuals (Barscher et al., 21). This variable will be operationalized using the college degree attainment rate by state in 2018, whose data I retrieved from The Chronicle of Higher Education. The data was broken down by attainment levels; I manually calculated the percent of each state's population by combining bachelor's, professional, and doctorate degree attainment together ("Compare the States"). 
  • Unionization Rate: In connection with right-to-work laws noted above, declining (private sector) unionization and union membership regardless of "right-to-work" laws has been argued to be a significant cause behind recent increases in income inequality (Hiltzik). Data on each state's union membership rate out of the total labor force came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("Hawaii and New York"). 
Statistical analysis will consist of summary statistics and correlation While doing multi-OLS regression would likely reveal some critical relationships between the variables being studied, I currently don't have the means to conduct such analysis at the moment, but if I do get access, I will follow-up on this post and conduct further analysis. 

Results:
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes: There are 48 total observations. All standard deviations were found using the Excel function "STDEV.P". Values in red under the "quartiles" column indicate values within the middle 50% of each variable's distribution.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix:

Summary statistics for each variable is included in Table 1. Per the correlational results in Table 2, neither the independent or the control variables have a strong correlation (either direction) with the explanatory, although some of the correlational directions seem interesting based on research presented above. Particularly, the main IV-DV relationship is positively-correlated, meaning that an increase in state-level minimum wages is associated with an increase in the gini coefficient (representing income inequality). Even more surprising is that states with higher top marginal tax rates have an even stronger positive relationship with their respective Gini coefficients. In addition, the relationship between each state's right-to-work laws and unionization %, with respective Gini coefficients is unusual as the former is negatively associated with the Gini coefficient while the latter is positively associated. This indicates that at the macro-level, higher unionization is associated with higher Gini coefficient values, and that "right-to-work" laws are associated with lower Gini coefficients. Finally, higher levels of post-secondary educational attainment ("PSAttain") is positively correlated with higher Gini coefficient values. 

Conclusion and Implications: While the results of this study seem to show significant results, there are several important limitations to keep in mind. First, this study is a macro-level data survey, and does not take into account a variety of micro-level factors that could influence income inequality, as well as income inequality within states. Second, I was unable to study several critical factors that have been widely-cited as contributing to recent increases in income inequality, particularly globalization, automation, political factors, and Federal-level policies (such as the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act). Finally, when talking about income inequality in this context, I only looked at the absolute level and extent of income inequality, and not the actual relative situation at a macro- or micro-level. In other words, a jurisdiction could have high income inequality per se, but where even low-income residents have a reasonable standard of living and sufficient opportunities to improve their socio-economic status above a level that is considered "reasonable." 

Despite these factors, there are two critical implications of this study's results. The first is that conducting an econometric analysis is critical to further understanding the interaction between the variables used in this study. Second, the results of this study also show that in connection to what was said above, more than just state-level policies likely have an impact on income inequality, something that I did not study for this post. Regardless, the results of this study contribute to the ever-growing body of discussion and research about income inequality, one of the most pressing policy issues of the 21st century. 

Works Cited: 

Alsama, Nabeel, William Carrington, Molly Dahl, and Justin Falk. "The Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase on Employment and Family Income." Congressional Budget Office, Feb. 2014, www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44995-MinimumWage.pdf. 

Bartscher, Alina, Moritz Kuhn, and Moritz Schularick. "The College Wealth Divide:
Education and Inequality in America, 1956-2016." St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, 13 Dec. 2018, www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/hfs/is-college-worth it/bartscher_kuhn_schularick_college_wealth_divide.pdf?la=en. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Bruno, Robert, and Frank Manzo IV. "The Impact of “Right-to-Work” Laws on Labor Market Outcomes in Three Midwest States: Evidence from Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin (2010–2016)." Project for Middle Class Renewal, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 3 Apr. 2017, ler.illinois.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/RTW-in-the-Midwest-2010-2016.pdf. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Hiltzik, Michael. "IMF agrees: Decline of union power has increased income inequality." Los Angeles Times, 25 Mar. 2015, www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-imf-agrees-loss-of-union-power-20150325-column.html. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Jordan, Jeffrey, Aparna Mathur,Abdul Munasib, and Devesh Roy. "Did right-to-work laws impactincomeinequality?Evidence from U.S. states using the Synthetic Control Method." American Enterprise Institute, Mar. 2016, www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/rtw-laws-inequality.pdf." Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

McLure, Charles. "Income tax." Brittanica, last revised 20 Sept. 2017, www.britannica.com/topic/income-tax/Family-factors-and-personal-deductions. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

"Right to work frequently asked questions." National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

"The Impact of Right-to-Work laws and declining unionization on the economy." Service Employees International Union 49, 14 Nov. 2017, www.seiu49.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/60/files/2018/04/TWR_RTW-FactsSheet.pdf. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Thompson, Derek. "The Labor Department's New Report isn't So Gloomy." The Atlantic, 5 Oct. 2019, www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/labor-departments-new-report-isnt-so-gloomy/599491/. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Data Sources:

“Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in non-farm employment under state law: Selected Years 
1968 to 2018.” United States Department of Labor, last revised Jan. 2020, www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

"Compare the States Almanac 2018-Demographics." The Chronicle of Higher Education, 19 Aug. 2018, www.chronicle.com/interactives/almanac-2018. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Duffin, Erin. "Gini coefficient as a measure for household income distribution inequality for U.S. states in 2018." Statista, 11 Oct. 2019, www.statista.com/statistics/227249/greatest-gap-between-rich-and-poor-by-us-state/. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

"Hawaii and New York had highest union membership rates, the Carolinas the lowest, in 2018." Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, 22 Feb. 2019, www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/hawaii-and-new-york-had-highest-union-membership-rates-the-carolinas-the-lowest-in-2018.htm." Accessed 19 Jul. 2020.

"Right to work states timeline." National Right to Work Committee, nrtwc.org/facts/state-right-to-work-timeline-2016/. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

Scarboro, Morgan. "State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2018." The Tax Foundation, 5 Mar. 2018, taxfoundation.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-brackets-2018/. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020. 

July 12, 2020

Quantitative Modeling of Domestic Consumption Part 2: Using a Dynamic Model

Author's Notes: Tonight's post will be a continuation of July 2nd's post, where I utilized economic data to generate econometric models to measure domestic consumption. This post was a follow-up course deliverable to the previous post's course deliverable, where I  utilized regular and logged OLS regression on macroeconomic data to model domestic consumption. Tonight's post will not only utilize regular regression once again, but will also introduce a dynamic regression model, which will be created by lagging key explanatory variables to account for time-based trends in the data. 

In addition, I created a public Twitter account, where I will not only share and discuss current events, news articles, and anything that comes up in my life, but will also post updates and announcements regarding this blog.