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Hello all readers, Welcome to The Parmeter Politics and Policy Record ! My name is Nathan Parmeter, an aspiring public policy professional a...

December 17, 2020

Assessing 2020's Electoral Bellwethers Part 2: Presidential Counties

Assessing 2020's Electoral Bellwethers Part 2: Presidential Counties

Introduction: This post sat on the backburner since before November 4th to await full election results, which are now finalized in the form of this year's Electoral College.  With that in mind, it is time to determine and analyze what trends the results from this blog's nine bellwether counties revealed about the presidential election. The link to the original post identifying the bellwethers is below. 



Table 1: 2020 Presidential Bellwether Counties Recent Electoral History

Note: Each number represents the percentage difference between the winning candidate and losing candidate in each county. 2020, 2016, 2012, and 2008 numbers are from the presidential election from each respective year. As 2018 was a midterm election year, there are no presidential results available. For the counties from states with Senate elections (AZ, FL, OH, PA, TX, WI), I utilized the results from that state's Senate election. Since GA and IA did not have Senate elections in 2018, I utilized both states' 2018 gubernatorial election results. Finally, since North Carolina did not have a Senate or Gubernatorial election in 2018, I utilized the NC-9 result (which was subsequently thrown-out and a new election was held). 

Election Results Sources: CNN (2018 and 2020); The New York Times (2016 and 2014); David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2012 and 2008); all links are below. 

The Bellwethers:

    Arizona-Maricopa County (Will Sun Belt Hispanic voters turn out for Biden?):



Image Source: Sumiaz. "File:Map of Arizona highlighting Maricopa County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, last modified 28 Feb. 2015, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Arizona_highlighting_Maricopa_County.svg. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020. 

    Mixed. In Arizona and Maricopa County, turnout was critical despite declining margins. 

     As detailed previously, this year saw a notable Democratic Latino voting slump compared to 2016, with the exact size of the decline being variable. In particular, Texas's Rio Grande Valley and Florida saw significant Latino swings towards Trump, both of which have been covered in previous posts. As has been, and will likely be repeated on this blog, a likely reason for this trend: many Latino voters identifying more as White and working-class voters, and thus being open to Republican policy ideas (and opposed to progressive Democratic ideas impacting their workforce), reduced Democratic outreach towards that group, and Trump downplaying immigration-related rhetoric during this election cycle (Caputo). Heavily-Latino Nevada also saw a closer result than expected, partially due to Biden underperforming among that group there (Mueller and Strott). 

     In Arizona specifically, post-election analysis has indicated that Latino turnout increased this year relative to 2016, especially among young Latinos, and that this group may have been critical for Biden's narrow victory in the Grand Canyon State (Summers). In the lead-up to Election Day, Latino voter groups worked hard to get Latino voters to the polls, especially those who were eligible to vote but previously didn't (Galka; "In Battleground"). Despite these factors and Biden's win in both Maricopa County and Arizona, Trump performed well in majority-Latino parts of the state such as urban Phoenix's AZ-9 district (Bronner). 

    Florida-Miami-Dade County (How will the Cuban-American population vote this year?):


Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Florida highlighting Miami-Dade County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 14 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Florida_highlighting_Miami-Dade_County.svg. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020. 
     
     Very Republican. 

     I'm not going to elaborate further, since this theme is a broken record at this point, and because Part 1 goes into depth about this trend. 

    Georgia-Fayette County (How much improvement room do Democrats have in traditionally-heavy Republican Sun Belt suburbs?): 


Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Georgia highlighting Fayette County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 12 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Georgia_highlighting_Fayette_County.svg. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020. 

     A lot of improvement room, although it won't all come overnight, and at a lower speed downballot. 

     As the votes were counted, many of the traditionally-red Sun Belt suburbs that trended Democratic but still voted Republican in 2016 and/or 2018 shifted colors on the national map. As detailed in last week's post, a group of Sun Belt suburban counties flipped from red to blue and broke longtime Republican voting streaks this year, including Arizona's Maricopa County (Phoenix), Texas's Tarrant County (Forth Worth), Florida's Duval County (Jacksonville), and Virginia Beach City. President-elect Joe Biden (D) also significantly improved over Hillary Clinton's 2016 performance in another bloc of similar suburban counties that still voted Republican this time. These places included Cabarrus, North Carolina (exurban Charlotte), Douglas, Colorado (suburban and exurban Denver), Oklahoma, Oklahoma (Oklahoma City), Williamson, Tennessee (suburban Nashville), Collin and Denton, Texas in the DFW metroplex, Madison, Alabama (Huntsville), and the county of focus here, Fayette, Georgia. 

    Per Table 1 above, Fayette County's shift from being solidly-red to light-red has been rapid in the Trump era, with the county voting for Trump by less than 10% after it voted for Governor Brian Kemp (R) two years ago by double digits, and Trump by a similar margin four years ago. The reduced margin here was likely a critical factor in aiding Biden's narrow victory in the Peachtree State, where the Atlanta suburbs swung left for the second cycle in a row. These results seem to indicate that at the top-level, traditional Republican strength in major Sun Belt suburban areas such as Fayette are dwindling, especially with Trump at the party's helm. 

     While the top-level Republican plunge in once-reliability red Sun Belt suburbs such as Fayette were unprecedented, downballot results tell a different story, especially one that indicates that Democrats' gains in such places are not equal at all levels, or are not happening all at once. As noted in previous posts, this year saw a significant amount of Biden/downballot Republican split-ticket voting in Sun Belt suburbs, which led to underwhelming results for Democrats in key House and Senate races. While Georgia's Senate races will be resolved by runoffs in two weeks, the first round (e.g. Election Day) results show Regular Senate Democratic candidate Jon Ossoff running behind Biden in Atlanta's suburban counties including Fayette (Hallerman). Meanwhile, Democrat Cal Cunningham underperformed Biden in North Carolina's major suburbs, likely helping Sen. Thom Tillis (R) secure another term (Kondik and Sabato). In Texas, Senator John Cornyn (R) won another term while running ahead of Trump in Texas's major suburban and urban counties ("Texas Election"). Finally, other than GA-7 in the Atlanta suburbs and two safe blue North Carolina seats that were the result of redistricting, Democratic dreams to pick up more suburban Sun Belt House seats fell through, ranging from AZ-6 in the Phoenix suburbs, to CA-25 in the Antelope Valley, TX-24 around the DFW Airport, TX-22 outside Houston, NC-8 in exurban Charlotte, and CA-50 in San Diego's outer suburbs. These failures were compounded by the defeats of multiple suburban first-year Democrats in the Sun Belt, including Reps. Harley Rouda (CA-48) and Gil Cisneros (CA-39) in Orange County, Rep. Joe Cunningham (SC-1) in suburban Charleston, and Rep. Kendra Horn (OK-5) in Oklahoma City. Furthermore, several other incumbents in similar districts had narrow re-elections, including Rep. Abigail Spanberger in VA-7 (Richmond suburbs), Rep. Lizzie Fletcher in TX-7 (suburban Houston), Rep. Mike Levin in CA-49 (Northern San Diego County), and Rep. Susie Lee in NV-3 (suburban Las Vegas). 

    Iowa-Cerro Gordo County (Will historically-Democratic Trump-won Upper Midwest small-city counties remain Republican?):

Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Iowa highlighting Cerro Gordo County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 12 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Iowa_highlighting_Cerro_Gordo_County.svg. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020. 
     
     Overall, yes. 

     Despite Democratic hopes that the once-blue rural and small-city Upper Midwest (including Iowa) would swing back and repudiate Trump, Cerro Gordo and other similar counties in the region remained red. Iowa voted for Trump by a similar margin as in 2016, while other rural parts of the Upper Midwest refused to budge after Trump's significant 2016 gains, or only slightly moved back towards the blue. Cerro Gordo County was one of these places, voting for Trump by 6%, 1% less than his 2016 margin. 

     Aside from Cerro Gordo, other once-Democratic small city counties in the Midwest that voted for Trump twice include Kenosha (Kenosha) and Racine, Wisconsin (Racine), Des Moines, Iowa (Burlington), Dubuque, Iowa (Dubuque), Clinton, Iowa (Clinton), and Mower, Minnesota (Austin), illustrating the extent to which Trump's gains here may have been permanent. A significant exit poll result that may explain why non-urban voters in Iowa (and by the extension, the Upper Midwest) stayed with Trump despite the trade war impacting their region: Over half of Iowa voters had a favorable view of the economy ("Iowa 2020 Presidential"), which can be used as a proxy for economic policy in the modern age (Kim). Out of those 51% of Iowa's voters, an overwhelming number voted for Trump, while 30% of those who thought the economy was "Not so good" also went for the ex-businessman, compared to 17% of those who thought the economy was "Good" ("Iowa 2020 Presidential"). 

    North Carolina-Robeson County (Will Southern rural nonwhite voters turn out for Biden?): 

Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of North Carolina highlighting Robeson County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 12 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_North_Carolina_highlighting_Robeson_County.svg. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

     Generally somewhat-to yes nationwide, but quite the opposite here.  

     As part of his victory in North Carolina four years ago, Trump won majority-nonwhite Robeson County for the first time in years, which contains a sizable number of Lumbee Native Americans. During the 2020 general election season, both Trump and Biden worked to court Native voters here, especially with both expressing support for the tribe's quest to become federally-recognized (Carter). Yet, as the results came in on Election Night, Robeson County didn't just vote for Trump again, but voted for him by a larger percentage margin than even Barack Obama's 2008 victory here (see Table 1). 

     In other parts of the country, rural nonwhite voting groups generally turned out for Biden with some exceptions, especially the previously-discussed case of Rio Grande Valley Latinos (Caputo). As I already discussed that group earlier under "Maricopa County," I won't discuss that group a second time. Outside North Carolina, one group that turned out heavily for Biden in the south and west were Native American voters, whose nations have been hit hard by COVID (Noisecat; Smith). In particular, Navajo Nation turnout increase significantly compared with 2016, and these voters overwhelmingly went for the Biden/Harris ticket, which may have been critical in helping the Democratic ticket win Arizona (Fonseca and Kastanis). I was not able to find much discussion talking specifically about Southern "Black Belt" turnout, but doing a simple comparison of 2020's and 2016's raw election results from majority-Black rural Southern counties show that Biden's margins in such places either were a wash or lower relative to 2016. One notable place highlighted by The Guardian where this occurred is North Carolina's Northampton County, a majority-Black rural county where Biden's margin declined 5% from Clinton's (Davis). 

    Ohio-Portage County (Can Biden successfully replicate the Obama coalition?):


Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Ohio highlighting Portage County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 12 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ohio_highlighting_Portage_County.svg. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020. 

    Overall, no, especially locales with socially-conservative, economically-populist blue-collar voters. 

    Despite pre-election analysis and polling showing Biden performing better than Clinton among blue-collar and middle-class voters in the Midwest and Rust Belt (Feiner; Siders), these predictions did not come true on November 3rd. Many blue-collar and working/middle-class "Obama coalition" Middle America counties remained red or even swung away from Biden. Portage was one of them, having moved 3% more Republican compared to 2016 (Table 1). As detailed in last Sunday's post on notable county flips, neighboring Mahoning County and Lorain County on the opposite end of Metro Cleveland flipped red after narrowly voting for Hillary Clinton four years ago. Neither had voted Republican in a long time (Orner), showing the extent of Trump's gains in the region and its voters. In 2008 and 2012, Obama won all three counties, in addition to performing well in the blue-collar, heavily-unionized Midwest and Rust Belt ("2012 Presidential General," "2008 Presidential General"). But the one Rust Belt county that best encapsulates this trend is neighboring Michigan's Macomb County, a largely White blue-collar and middle-class suburban county next to Detroit that is well-known in the political science community for pollster Stan Greenberg's classic research on Macomb's "Reagan Democrats" ("Long-time"). These same voters likely helped Trump flip both Macomb County and Michigan red four years ago, as his economic populism heavily resonated in the area (Feiner). This year, Macomb County stuck with Trump, while neighboring Oakland County, which is increasingly diverse, became more blue (Dulio and Klemanski; Neher and Roth). 

     While I was not able to find the original Tweet, or another credible source to back up this theory, a post-election Tweet I saw several weeks ago speculated that blue-collar locales with historically-Democratic, but heavily-religious social conservatives swung back less than working-class locales with more secular voters. This will be discussed further in Lackawanna's entry below, which has a similar story to Portage. 

    Pennsylvania-Lackawanna County (After almost voting for Trump, will historically-Democratic blue-collar medium-sized cities swing back to Biden?): 

Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Pennsylvania highlighting Lackawanna County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 12 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Pennsylvania_highlighting_Lackawanna_County.svg. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020. 

     Somewhat, but not back to Obama 2012 levels, much less Obama 2008. 

     As part of flipping back the Keystone State, Joe Biden slightly improved the Democratic margin in Lackawanna County, home to his birthplace of Scranton (Davis). However, as Table 1 shows, Biden's margin there did not come anywhere close to Obama's 2012 showing, Governor Tom Wolf's margin in the 2014 "Red Wave," or Senator Bob Casey (D)'s reelection performance in 2018. Other similar historically-Democratic blue-collar and industrial locales that voted for Obama, Trump and Biden include Erie (Erie) and Northampton (Bethlehem) Counties, also in Pennsylvania, Blue Earth, MN (Mankato), Montgomery, OH (Dayton), Broome, NY (Binghamton), Saginaw, MI (Saginaw), Gloucester, NJ (suburban and exurban Philadelphia), and Rensselaer, NY (across from Albany). Despite Biden's flipping of these locales, most featured close margins, showing the limitations of Biden's blue-collar support relative to pre-election expectations. 

    Texas-Tarrant County (Will any counties with over 1 million people vote for Trump?):


Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Texas highlighting Tarrant County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 12 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Texas_highlighting_Tarrant_County.svg. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020. 

     After initially creating this question, I realized that New York's Suffolk County was probably in theory a better bellwether for this trend, considering how Republican it leans compared to the nation, but as New York is not a battleground (any more), Tarrant made the cut. 

     Out all U.S. counties with over a million people ("Large counties"), only one voted for Trump this year, Long Island's Suffolk County, which voted for Trump by less than 200 votes ("Presidential Election" 2020). Compared with 2016, Maricopa, Arizona and Tarrant, Texas flipped blue ("Presidential Election" 2020), leaving Suffolk, Collin and Denton Counties in the DFW Metroplex, and California's Kern County (Bakersfield) as the only counties with at least 800,000 people that voted for Trump ("Large counties," "Presidential Election" 2020). 

    Wisconsin-Milwaukee County (Will the 2020 urban Black vote look like 2016 or 2012/2008?): 


Image Source: Benbennick, David. "File:Map of Wisconsin highlighting Milwaukee County.svg." Wikimedia Commons, 13 Feb. 2006, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Wisconsin_highlighting_Milwaukee_County.svg. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020. 

    More like 2016 than 2012/2008, possibly lower. 

    This year, Joe Biden narrowly won back Wisconsin after Trump's historic 2016 victory there, which is partially attributable (among other factors) to a decline in the urban Black vote in Milwaukee County, which hurt Hillary Clinton (Sommerhauser). Compared with 2016, Biden's net margin in Milwaukee County increased by around 20,000 votes, although neither Biden or Trump matched Obama's or Romney's raw vote share, respectively ("2012 Presidential General"). This small net increase alone seems to show that urban Black turnout likely did not reach 2012 or 2008 levels, and may have even decreased, something that is backed up by external analysis of Milwaukee voting precincts (Otterbein; van Wagtendonk). 

     In other Rust Belt, Midwest, and Mid-Atlantic urban centers, urban Black turnout saw a similar story, with Biden regressing relative to 2016 to varying extents. In the swing-state urban centers of Detroit (Michigan) and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Biden performed well, but did not match Obama 2012's numbers, while Trump also significantly improved over his 2016 performance (Otterbein). Explanations that have been put forward for this decline include 1) Reduced outreach by the Biden campaign towards urban minorities, 2) Minorites' religious inclinations towards Republican religious identity, 3) Feelings among many that voting wouldn't improve local issues and conditions (Brennan et al.), 4) Minority support for Republican economic ideas, 5) Opposition to progressive Democratic talk of "Defund the Police" among urban minority communities, and 6) Trump's messages in general resonating with many working-class minorities (Caputo). 

Election Sources:

"2008 Presidential General Election Results." David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

"2012 Presidential General Election Results." David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020. 

"2016 Presidential Election Results." The New York Times, last modified 9 Aug. 2017, www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020. 

"Governor Election Results 2014." The New York Times, last modified 17 Dec. 2014, www.nytimes.com/elections/2014/results/governor?utm_source=top_nav&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=election-2014. Accessed 11 Dec. 2020. 

"National Results." CNN, www.cnn.com/election/2018/results. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020. 
  • 2018 Election Results
"Presidential Election Results and Electoral Map 2020." CNN, www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/president. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020. 

"Senate Election Results 2014." The New York Times last modified 17 Dec. 2014, www.nytimes.com/elections/2014/results/senate?utm_source=top_nav&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=election-2014. Accessed 11 Dec. 2020. 

Works Cited:

Barry, Kevin. "Speaking about the hardships in a changing world leads the way for Portage County voters." ABC5 News Cleveland, 12 Mar. 2020, www.news5cleveland.com/news/political/elections-local/speaking-about-the-hardships-in-a-changing-world-leads-the-way-for-portage-county-voters. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Brennan, Chris, et al. "Philly was supposed to turn out huge for Biden. It didn’t. What happened?" The Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 Nov. 2020, www.inquirer.com/politics/election/philadelphia-2020-election-turnout-biden-trump-20201115.html. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Bronner, Laura, Geoffrey Skelley, and Amelia Thoson-DeVeaux. "What We Know About How White and Latino Americans Voted In 2020." FiveThirtyEight, 23 Nov. 2020, fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-we-know-about-how-white-and-latino-americans-voted-in-2020/. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Caputo, Marc. "Culture wars fuel Trump’s blue-collar Latino gains." Politico, 21 Nov. 2020, www.politico.com/news/2020/11/21/culture-wars-latinos-trump-438932. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Carter, Andrew. "Urban and rural NC were already divided. The 2020 election pushed them farther apart." Charlotte News and Observer, 7 Nov. 2020, www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article246983722.html. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Coleman, J. Miles, and Kyle Kondik. "Notes on the State of the 2020 Election." Sabato's Crystal Ball, 12 Nov. 2020, centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/notes-on-the-state-of-the-2020-election/. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Davis, Ben. "The 10 swing state counties that tell the story of the 2020 election." The Guardian, 24 Nov. 2020, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/nov/24/the-10-swing-state-counties-that-tell-the-story-of-the-2020-election. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Dulio, David A., and John Klemanski. "Opinion: Election recap: How Macomb and Oakland counties are shifting." The Detroit News, 19 Nov. 2020, www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2020/11/20/opinion-election-recap-how-macomb-and-oakland-counties-shifting/3777544001/. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020.

Feiner, Lauren. "Michigan’s Macomb County is a crucial blue-collar battleground for Trump and Biden." CNBC, 14 Oct. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/2020-election-michigan-macomb-county-trump-biden.html. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Fonseca, Felicia, and Angeliki Kastanis. "Native American votes helped secure Biden’s win in Arizona." Associated Press, 19 Nov. 2020, apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-flagstaff-arizona-voting-rights-fa452fbd546fa00535679d78ac40b890. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Galka, Matt. "How the Latino vote shifted historically red Arizona to blue." Fox 10 Phoenix, 4 Nov. 2020, www.fox10phoenix.com/news/how-the-latino-vote-shifted-historically-red-arizona-to-blue. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Hallerman, Tamar. "Split-ticket voters helped Biden win Ga. Can they aid the GOP in the runoffs?" Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 16 Dec. 2020, www.ajc.com/politics/split-ticket-voters-helped-biden-win-ga-can-they-aid-the-gop-in-the-runoffs/NQO7Z7MAVJFHLIUOAIRONWO3H4/. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

"In Battleground Arizona, Latino Effort to Mobilize Voters Could Help Biden." US News and World Report, 3 Nov. 2020, www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2020-11-03/big-push-under-way-for-latino-turnout-in-battleground-arizona. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

"Iowa 2020 President Exit Polls." CNN, www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/iowa. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Kim, Anne. "New Poll: Trade was a top issue for many 2020 voters." tradevistas, 19 Nov. 2020, tradevistas.org/new-poll-trade-top-issue-for-many-2020-voters/. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

"Large counties in the United States by population." Ballotpedia, ballotpedia.org/Large_counties_in_the_United_States_by_population. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

"Long-time Democratic pollster takes another look at the Obama-Trump voters of Macomb County." Michigan Radio, 17 May 2018, www.michiganradio.org/post/long-time-democratic-pollster-takes-another-look-obama-trump-voters-macomb-county. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Mueller, Tabitha, and Savanna Scott. "Polls show how Latino voters helped drive Biden win in Nevada, though Trump gained ground since 2016." The Nevada Independent, 16 Nov. 2020, thenevadaindependent.com/article/polls-show-how-latino-voters-helped-drive-biden-win-in-nevada-though-trump-gained-ground-since-2016. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Neher, Jake, and Cheyna Roth. "Oakland and Macomb Counties Demonstrate How Divided Michigan Voters Are Becoming." WDET 101.9 fm, wdet.org/posts/2020/11/16/90296-oakland-and-macomb-counties-demonstrate-how-divided-michigan-voters-are-becoming/. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Noisecat, Julia Brave. "In Trump v. Biden, Native American voters played a crucial role. It's time to recognize that." NBC News, 27 Nov. 2020, www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-v-biden-native-american-voters-played-crucial-role-it-ncna1249005. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Orner, Ben. "Interactive: Explore the Ohio counties Trump and Biden flipped." NBC4i, 10 Nov. 2020, www.nbc4i.com/news/your-local-election-hq/interactive-explore-the-ohio-counties-trump-and-biden-flipped/. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Otterbein, Holly. "Why Biden didn’t do better in big cities." Politico, 15 Nov. 2020, www.politico.com/news/2020/11/15/big-cities-biden-election-436529. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

Siders, David. "‘It’s a big, big swing’: Trump loses ground with white voters." Politico, 21 Sept. 2020, www.politico.com/news/2020/09/21/trump-white-voters-support-418420. Accessed 18 Oct. 2020. 

Smith, Anna. "How Indigenous voters swung the 2020 election." HighCountry News, 6 Nov. 2020, www.hcn.org/articles/indigenous-affairs-how-indigenous-voters-swung-the-2020-election. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Sommerhauser, Mark. "Study: Black voter turnout in Wisconsin declined by nearly one-fifth in 2016." Wisconsin State-Journal, 7 Nov. 2017, madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/study-black-voter-turnout-in-wisconsin-declined-by-nearly-one-fifth-in-2016/article_d3e72e41-96a0-51fb-83ba-11dfc6693daf.html. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

Summers, Juana. "Why Joe Biden Saw Mixed Success With Latinos." National Public Radio, 5 Nov. 2020, www.npr.org/2020/11/05/931378189/what-we-know-about-the-latino-vote-in-some-key-states. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

"Texas Election Results and Maps 2020." CNN, 29 Nov. 2020, www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/state/texas. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020. 

van Wagtendonk, Anya. "‘Proud of my city’: Turnout down, but Milwaukee’s Black voters leapt hurdles to vote." The Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism, 11 Nov. 2020, www.wisconsinwatch.org/2020/11/milwaukee-black-voters-presidential-election-2020/. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020. 

December 13, 2020

Four Public Policy Implications from The Other Wes Moore and Hillbilly Elegy

Four Public Policy Implications from The Other Wes Moore and Hillbilly Elegy

Introduction: After several weeks of election-related coverage, I'm finally ready to go back to The Other Wes Moore and Hillbilly Elegy, two books I initially covered in October. That initial post synthesized several common policy themes between the two books, some of which will be reiterated in today's post. With those themes in mind, today's post will go over several significant policy implications I found when reading both books, especially relating to social and economic policy. 

Social Policy Implications:
  • Ensuring all teenagers can finish high school is just as important as emphasizing college enrollment: Between Hillbilly Elegy and The Other Wes Moore, while both respective authors ended up attending college and becoming successful, both note instances of classmates and subjects who didn't finish high school, or came close to not. In Hillbilly Elegy, the chaotic family situation facing J.D. Vance led his academic performance to suffer in his first two years of high school, which almost led him to drop out (Vance 127-130; 151; 155). At the end of Hillbilly Elegy, Vance talked with teachers from his hometown, who expressed concern over society's heavy focus on college, noting that many students come from backgrounds unable to complete college, and need critical interventions much earlier in life (Vance 244-245). Meanwhile, in The Other Wes Moore, the other Wes Moore and his brother Tony became school dropouts early, turning to a life on the streets of Baltimore (Moore 56-59). Even when he returned to school after an incident that got him locked up briefly, his stint at school was short, and he returned to the streets (Moore, 109-110). These experiences show, in connection with the third policy implication, that while college is increasingly important to achieve the American Dream, if a teenager cannot finish high school, then they cannot achieve a college degree, much less find a high-quality job. 
  • Social capital is critical to help teenagers and young adults in achieving success, especially those from working- or low-income backgrounds: This policy implication was already discussed in detail on the first post, so I won't go into it too much. Nonetheless, as both Moore and Vance note in their respective books, social capital they gained through external experiences (e.g. college, the military) helped them on their respective paths to success, which would have been more difficult without. 
  • What happens outside school can have significant consequences on youth development: This implication can also apply as a theme that I didn't cover last time, but is one I consider critical to understanding Vance's and both Moores' (both the author and the "other") backgrounds, and what factors influenced their personal development. In particular, while both authors extensively talk about their educational experiences while growing up, a similar amount of time is spent talking about their non-educational life, and how said experiences contributed to their development. When growing up in the Bronx, while Author Moore was enrolled in an elite private school, he spent a significant amount of non-school (and school) time on the street, which included involvement in criminal activity that led to an encounter with the police (Moore 48, 76-84). Meanwhile, the other Wes Moore infrequently attended school before dropping out, and even when he did attend school, his non-school life was chaotic, as his father was absent from his life, his mother was a busy working mom, and much of his time was spent on the street (Moore 17-19, 30, 56-59). At the end of his book, Vance explicitly states that society and public policy (especially education policy) needs to increasingly consider what goes on in the non-school life of youth from communities experiencing socio-economic decline (Vance, 244-245). 
  • Unintended pregnancy, especially among teenagers, has serious negative externalities: In both books, Moore and Vance discuss cases of teenage pregnancy in their communities and the effects that it has on the parents and their personal and professional development. Most notably, after becoming a high school dropout, the other Moore impregnated his two teenage girlfriends multiple times, which put significant strain on his personal decisions and outlook (Moore 99-101, 110, 137-138). Going further, author Moore speculated that having several children to support may have been the downfall of other Moore, causing him to return to a life of crime post-Job Corps (Moore 181-182). In Vance's family, his cousin Gail was on track to enter college right after high school when she got pregnant, which threw her life into chaos, which included a straining of relations with her family (Vance 240-241). Fortunately, her life bounced back after she got a job, returned to school, and remarried (Vance 241). As these cases show, unintended pregnancies can have significant negative impacts on families and individuals, including family members and acquittances. 
Works Cited:

Moore, Wes. The Other Wes Moore. Spiegel and Grau: New York, 2011.

Vance, J.D. Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis. HarperCollins: New York, 2016.